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Estimates of the Number of Brand-name Drugs Affected by the Medicaid Rebate Cap in 2017
The Trump Administration has proposed uncapping Medicaid rebates to discourage drug price spikes. Drug manufacturers pay rebates to offset Medicaid pharmacy reimbursement, including a base rebate (23.1% of average manufacturer price [AMP] ) and an inflation rebate to counterbalance price increases above inflation. The cap, which was implemented in 2010, limits the total rebate to the drug's AMP, restricting manufacturer rebates for price increases more than 433% above inflation (ie, when the AMP equals 23.1% of AMP plus the difference between AMP and inflation-adjusted initial AMP). In this study, I estimated the number of brand-name drugs that had capped Medicaid payment rebates in 2017 and the total additional rebates without the cap. To estimate the number of drugs that triggered the cap, I identified the first full year of reimbursement data (ie, the second year of data) using a commercial database to link identifiers (National Drug Code) over time. Then, I calculated the inflation rebate for 2017 (the difference between the inflation-adjusted initial estimated AMP and the current estimated AMP) and identified all drugs whose total rebate exceeded the estimated AMP. I also calculated the amount above the cap (reduced rebate).
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Results | Of the 1705 brand-name drugs assessed, 271 drugs (15.9%; 250 non-5i drugs and 21 5i drugs) at the National Drug Code level triggered the cap, reducing rebate payments to Medicaid by US$103 540 808 ($52 619 984 non-5i drugs and $50 920 914 5i drugs) ( Table) in 2017. Seventy-five drugs (27.7%) had reduced rebates of greater than $100 000, and 85% of the reduced rebates were attributable to 25 drugs; diabetes treatments accounted for 46% of reduced rebates. Of the reduced rebates, 38% ($39 787 620) were attributable (Table) . Meanwhile, launch prices for new drugs have continued to rise. The latter half of 2017 witnessed the introduction of the novel chimeric antigen receptor (CAR) T-cell treatments tisagenlecleucel (Kymriah) and axicabtagene ciloleucel (Yescarta), priced at $475 000 and $373 000, respectively, for a one-time infusion. In early 2018, Spark Therapeutics announced that it would charge $850 000 for 2 injections of voretigene neparvovec (Luxturna), a gene therapy for inherited vision loss.
The burden of such high prices, already large, appears poised to grow. In a 2017 survey of 199 patients prescribed insulin, 25% reported cost-related underuse. 2 One commercial health plan recently reported that prescription drugs comprised one-fourth of its health care spending, 3 and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services projected that net US spending on prescription drugs would increase faster than any other major health care good or service over the next decade. 4 In response to widespread public concern, the Department of Health and Human Services published a blueprint last spring recommending several measures to improve price negotiation and competition. While these steps have been highly publicized, none are likely to move the needle to a measurable degree in reforming drug pricing. In some cases, the administration has worked against its own rhetoric by not supporting potentially useful ideas. For example, the blueprint calls on the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to issue guidance on combating the misuse of risk evaluation and mitigation strategies to delay generic competition, but the administration and FDA commissioner have been silent on stalled bipartisan legislation that would accomplish this goal-the CREATES Act-which the Congressional Budget Office 5 
